History log of /src/sys/sys/mac.h (Results 1 – 25 of 234)
Revision Date Author Comments
# 5140ccf2 29-Jul-2024 Olivier Certner <olce@FreeBSD.org>

MAC: mac.h: Fix missing includes/typedefs

This fixes inclusion from userspace, and also kernel inclusion for
source files not including explicitly nor implicitly <sys/types.h>.

Reviewed by: jami

MAC: mac.h: Fix missing includes/typedefs

This fixes inclusion from userspace, and also kernel inclusion for
source files not including explicitly nor implicitly <sys/types.h>.

Reviewed by: jamie
Approved by: markj (mentor)
MFC after: 5 days
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D46896

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# 95ee2897 16-Aug-2023 Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org>

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: two-line .h pattern

Remove /^\s*\*\n \*\s+\$FreeBSD\$$\n/


# 4d846d26 10-May-2023 Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org>

spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD

The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch
up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of

spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD

The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch
up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of BSD-2-Clause.

Discussed with: pfg
MFC After: 3 days
Sponsored by: Netflix

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# 5140ccf2 29-Jul-2024 Olivier Certner <olce@FreeBSD.org>

MAC: mac.h: Fix missing includes/typedefs

This fixes inclusion from userspace, and also kernel inclusion for
source files not including explicitly nor implicitly <sys/types.h>.

Reviewed by: jami

MAC: mac.h: Fix missing includes/typedefs

This fixes inclusion from userspace, and also kernel inclusion for
source files not including explicitly nor implicitly <sys/types.h>.

Reviewed by: jamie
Approved by: markj (mentor)
MFC after: 5 days
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D46896

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# 95ee2897 16-Aug-2023 Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org>

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: two-line .h pattern

Remove /^\s*\*\n \*\s+\$FreeBSD\$$\n/


# 4d846d26 10-May-2023 Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org>

spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD

The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch
up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of

spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD

The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch
up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of BSD-2-Clause.

Discussed with: pfg
MFC After: 3 days
Sponsored by: Netflix

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# c4e20cad 27-Nov-2017 Pedro F. Giffuni <pfg@FreeBSD.org>

sys/sys: further adoption of SPDX licensing ID tags.

Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error

sys/sys: further adoption of SPDX licensing ID tags.

Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.

The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.

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# c4e20cad 27-Nov-2017 Pedro F. Giffuni <pfg@FreeBSD.org>

sys/sys: further adoption of SPDX licensing ID tags.

Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error

sys/sys: further adoption of SPDX licensing ID tags.

Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.

The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.

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# 4dbb37bd 06-Feb-2007 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Update comments in mac.h.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project


# c96ae196 06-Feb-2007 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:

Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel

Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:

Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel
representation of MAC labels.

Remove mac.h includes from policies and MAC framework components that do
not use userspace MAC API definitions.

Add _KERNEL inclusion checks to mac_internal.h and mac_policy.h, as these
are kernel-only include files

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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# aed55708 22-Oct-2006 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitio

Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.

This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA

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# d94f2a68 12-Sep-2006 Christian S.J. Peron <csjp@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry point
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example whe

Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry point
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.

This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.

[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
an example being icmp_error()

This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC

Submitted by: mlaier [1]
MFC after: 1 week

This is a RELENG_6 candidate

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# 7935d538 06-Apr-2006 Christian S.J. Peron <csjp@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce a new MAC entry point for label initialization of the NFS daemon's
credential: mac_associate_nfsd_label()

This entry point can be utilized by various Mandatory Access Control policies
so t

Introduce a new MAC entry point for label initialization of the NFS daemon's
credential: mac_associate_nfsd_label()

This entry point can be utilized by various Mandatory Access Control policies
so they can properly initialize the label of files which get created
as a result of an NFS operation. This work will be useful for fixing kernel
panics associated with accessing un-initialized or invalid vnode labels.

The implementation of these entry points will come shortly.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD
Requested by: mdodd
MFC after: 3 weeks

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# 5bb52dc4 02-Oct-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Complete removal of mac_create_root_mount/mpo_create_root_mount MAC
interfaces.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Submitted by: Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
MFC after: 3 days


# d26dd2d9 14-Jul-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

When devfs cloning takes place, provide access to the credential of the
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers

When devfs cloning takes place, provide access to the credential of the
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.

- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.

- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().

- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.

- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.

- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.

While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.

Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons

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# 3c308b09 05-Jul-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Eliminate MAC entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(), which is
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and

Eliminate MAC entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(), which is
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)

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# 6758f88e 05-Jul-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Add MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point mac_check_socket_create(),
which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC
policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, ty

Add MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point mac_check_socket_create(),
which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC
policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and
protocol.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
Requested by: SCC

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# 3831e7d7 07-Jun-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Gratuitous renaming of four System V Semaphore MAC Framework entry
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:

mac_init_sys

Gratuitous renaming of four System V Semaphore MAC Framework entry
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:

mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()

Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA

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# 52648411 04-May-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control
access to POSIX Semaphores:

mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem()

Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control
access to POSIX Semaphores:

mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore

Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.

Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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# babe9a2b 18-Apr-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points
mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific
processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flo

Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points
mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific
processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from
children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully
due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of
wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for
this reason.

The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new
entry points.

Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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# 7f53207b 16-Apr-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to
control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations,
required for some policies:

poll() mac_ch

Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to
control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations,
required for some policies:

poll() mac_check_socket_poll()
fstat() mac_check_socket_stat()
accept() mac_check_socket_accept()

Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points.
While here, add missing entry point implementations for:

mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive()
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible()

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA

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# 030a28b3 16-Apr-2005 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use
of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential,
including:

setuid() mac_check_proc

Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use
of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential,
including:

setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid()
seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid()
setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid()
setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid()
setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups()
setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid()
setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid()
setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid()
setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid()

MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both
current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments
to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated.

Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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# c92163dc 14-Apr-2005 Christian S.J. Peron <csjp@FreeBSD.org>

Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive to
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform acc

Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive to
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.

-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.

Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month

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# 42726d8a 17-Nov-2004 Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>

Define new MAC framework and policy entry points for System V IPC
objects and operations:

- System V IPC message, message queue, semaphore, and shared memory
segment init, destroy, cleanup, create

Define new MAC framework and policy entry points for System V IPC
objects and operations:

- System V IPC message, message queue, semaphore, and shared memory
segment init, destroy, cleanup, create operations.

- System V IPC message, message queue, seamphore, and shared memory
segment access control entry points, including rights to attach,
destroy, and manipulate these IPC objects.

Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research

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# 89c9c53d 16-Jun-2004 Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@FreeBSD.org>

Do the dreaded s/dev_t/struct cdev */
Bump __FreeBSD_version accordingly.


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