History log of /linux/security/ipe/audit.c (Results 1 – 25 of 37)
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# ab93e0dd 06-Aug-2025 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.17 merge window.


# a7bee4e7 04-Aug-2025 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge tag 'ib-mfd-gpio-input-pwm-v6.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/lee/mfd into next

Merge an immutable branch between MFD, GPIO, Input and PWM to resolve
conflicts for the mer

Merge tag 'ib-mfd-gpio-input-pwm-v6.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/lee/mfd into next

Merge an immutable branch between MFD, GPIO, Input and PWM to resolve
conflicts for the merge window pull request.

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# b4efd625 31-Jul-2025 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20250728' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe

Pull ipe update from Fan Wu:
"A single commit from Eric Biggers to simplify the IPE (Integrity
Policy Enforc

Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20250728' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe

Pull ipe update from Fan Wu:
"A single commit from Eric Biggers to simplify the IPE (Integrity
Policy Enforcement) policy audit with the SHA-256 library API"

* tag 'ipe-pr-20250728' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
ipe: use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash API

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Revision tags: v6.16, v6.16-rc7, v6.16-rc6, v6.16-rc5, v6.16-rc4, v6.16-rc3, v6.16-rc2, v6.16-rc1, v6.15, v6.15-rc7
# b90bb6db 14-May-2025 Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

ipe: use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash API

audit_policy() does not support any other algorithm, so the crypto_shash
abstraction provides no value. Just use the SHA-256 library API
ins

ipe: use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash API

audit_policy() does not support any other algorithm, so the crypto_shash
abstraction provides no value. Just use the SHA-256 library API
instead, which is much simpler and easier to use.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>

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# 74f1af95 29-Jun-2025 Rob Clark <robin.clark@oss.qualcomm.com>

Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-next' into msm-next

Back-merge drm-next to (indirectly) get arm-smmu updates for making
stall-on-fault more reliable.

Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robin.clark@oss

Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-next' into msm-next

Back-merge drm-next to (indirectly) get arm-smmu updates for making
stall-on-fault more reliable.

Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robin.clark@oss.qualcomm.com>

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# c598d5eb 11-Jun-2025 Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Backmerging to forward to v6.16-rc1

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>


# 86e2d052 09-Jun-2025 Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Backmerging to bring in 6.16

Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>


# 34c55367 09-Jun-2025 Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync to v6.16-rc1, among other things to get the fixed size GENMASK_U*()
and BIT_U*() macros.

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>


# 12e9b9e5 29-May-2025 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20250527' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe

Pull IPE update from Fan Wu:
"A single commit from Jasjiv Singh, that adds an errno field to IPE
policy load

Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20250527' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe

Pull IPE update from Fan Wu:
"A single commit from Jasjiv Singh, that adds an errno field to IPE
policy load auditing to log failures with error details, not just
successes.

This improves the security audit trail and helps diagnose policy
deployment issues"

* tag 'ipe-pr-20250527' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing

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Revision tags: v6.15-rc6, v6.15-rc5, v6.15-rc4, v6.15-rc3, v6.15-rc2, v6.15-rc1, v6.14, v6.14-rc7
# 1d887d6f 13-Mar-2025 Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com>

ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing

Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
of pote

ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing

Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE.

This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event
to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy
loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious
attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events.

The new error field will capture the following error codes:

* -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring
* -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version
* -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed
* -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating
* -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed
* -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow
* -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error
* -EPERM: Insufficient permission
* -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM)
* -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid

Here are some examples of the updated audit record types:

AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422):
audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1
policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA
92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0

The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into
the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0.

AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error:

audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=?
auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74

The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy
(-EBADMSG).

By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts,
whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive
audit trail for IPE policy management.

Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>

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Revision tags: v6.14-rc6, v6.14-rc5, v6.14-rc4, v6.14-rc3, v6.14-rc2
# c771600c 05-Feb-2025 Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

We need
4ba4f1afb6a9 ("perf: Generic hotplug support for a PMU with a scope")
in order to land a i915 PMU simplification and a fix. That landed in 6.12
and

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

We need
4ba4f1afb6a9 ("perf: Generic hotplug support for a PMU with a scope")
in order to land a i915 PMU simplification and a fix. That landed in 6.12
and we are stuck at 6.9 so lets bump things forward.

Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>

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Revision tags: v6.14-rc1
# 25768de5 21-Jan-2025 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.14 merge window.


Revision tags: v6.13, v6.13-rc7, v6.13-rc6, v6.13-rc5, v6.13-rc4
# 6d4a0f4e 17-Dec-2024 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge tag 'v6.13-rc3' into next

Sync up with the mainline.


Revision tags: v6.13-rc3, v6.13-rc2, v6.13-rc1, v6.12, v6.12-rc7, v6.12-rc6, v6.12-rc5, v6.12-rc4
# 77b67945 14-Oct-2024 Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

Merge tag 'v6.12-rc3' into perf-tools-next

To get the fixes in the current perf-tools tree.

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>


Revision tags: v6.12-rc3
# a0efa2f3 09-Oct-2024 Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

Merge net-next/main to resolve conflicts

The wireless-next tree was based on something older, and there
are now conflicts between -rc2 and work here. Merge net-next,
which has enough of -rc2 for the

Merge net-next/main to resolve conflicts

The wireless-next tree was based on something older, and there
are now conflicts between -rc2 and work here. Merge net-next,
which has enough of -rc2 for the conflicts to happen, resolving
them in the process.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

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Revision tags: v6.12-rc2
# b88132ce 04-Oct-2024 Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Backmerging to resolve a conflict with core locally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>


# 3fd6c590 30-Sep-2024 Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>

Merge tag 'v6.12-rc1' into clk-meson-next

Linux 6.12-rc1


# 2dd0ef5d 30-Sep-2024 Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Get drm-misc-next to up v6.12-rc1.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>


# e0568571 30-Sep-2024 Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync to v6.12-rc1.

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>


# c8d430db 06-Oct-2024 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1

- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not chang

Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1

- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical
system registers as we're about to fail

- Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value
common to all CPUs

- Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current
code is pretty broken

- Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps
down -- hopefully only temporarly

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# 0c436dfe 02-Oct-2024 Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.12-rc1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v6.12

A bunch of fixes here that came in during the merge window and t

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.12-rc1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v6.12

A bunch of fixes here that came in during the merge window and the first
week of release, plus some new quirks and device IDs. There's nothing
major here, it's a bit bigger than it might've been due to there being
no fixes sent during the merge window due to your vacation.

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# 2cd86f02 01-Oct-2024 Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>

Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-fixes' into drm-misc-fixes

Required for a panthor fix that broke when
FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET was added in place of FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET.

Signed-off-by: Maarten L

Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-fixes' into drm-misc-fixes

Required for a panthor fix that broke when
FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET was added in place of FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET.

Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>

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Revision tags: v6.12-rc1
# 3a39d672 27-Sep-2024 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

No conflicts and no adjacent changes.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>


# a430d95c 16-Sep-2024 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

- Move the LSM framework to static calls

This transitions the vast ma

Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

- Move the LSM framework to static calls

This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
date.

- Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM

This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
widely posted over several years.

Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
directly during the next merge window.

- Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework

Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.

Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
provides a XFRM LSM implementation.

- Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN

The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.

- Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook

Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
released due to RCU.

Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
callback.

- Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns

The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.

- Various cleanups and improvements

A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
minor style fixups.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
documentation: add IPE documentation
ipe: kunit test for parser
scripts: add boot policy generation program
ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
ipe: add permissive toggle
...

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Revision tags: v6.11, v6.11-rc7, v6.11-rc6, v6.11-rc5, v6.11-rc4, v6.11-rc3, v6.11-rc2
# 31f8c868 03-Aug-2024 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider

Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity
file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest"
and al

ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider

Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity
file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest"
and all files using valid fsverity builtin signatures via
"fsverity_signature".

This enables file-level integrity claims to be expressed in IPE,
allowing individual files to be authorized, giving some flexibility
for policy authors. Such file-level claims are important to be expressed
for enforcing the integrity of packages, as well as address some of the
scalability issues in a sole dm-verity based solution (# of loop back
devices, etc).

This solution cannot be done in userspace as the minimum threat that
IPE should mitigate is an attacker downloads malicious payload with
all required dependencies. These dependencies can lack the userspace
check, bypassing the protection entirely. A similar attack succeeds if
the userspace component is replaced with a version that does not
perform the check. As a result, this can only be done in the common
entry point - the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

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