262  * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
264  * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
265  * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
266  * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
269  * process's capability sets.  The changes are made to the proposed new
272 int cap_capset(struct cred *new,  in cap_capset()  argument
288 		/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */  in cap_capset()
291 	/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */  in cap_capset()
299 	new->cap_effective   = *effective;  in cap_capset()
300 	new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;  in cap_capset()
301 	new->cap_permitted   = *permitted;  in cap_capset()
307 	new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,  in cap_capset()
310 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_capset()
567  * Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0.
623  * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
631 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()  local
644 	new->cap_permitted.val =  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
645 		(new->cap_bset.val & caps->permitted.val) |  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
646 		(new->cap_inheritable.val & caps->inheritable.val);  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
648 	if (caps->permitted.val & ~new->cap_permitted.val)  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
832 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in handle_privileged_root()  local
841 	if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
850 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
852 		new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,  in handle_privileged_root()
858 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))  in handle_privileged_root()
886 static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,  in nonroot_raised_pE()  argument
891 	if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
892 	     !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
893 	       (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
896 	     __is_suid(root, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
897 	     !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
898 	    (uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
900 	       __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
901 	      __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))  in nonroot_raised_pE()
913  * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
923 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()  local
935 	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
940 	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
946 	 * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
948 	id_changed = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) || !in_group_p(new->egid);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
950 	if ((id_changed || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
952 	     !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
954 		if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
956 			new->euid = new->uid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
957 			new->egid = new->gid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
959 		new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
963 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
964 	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
968 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
974 	new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
981 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
983 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
985 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
988 	if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
989 		ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
994 	new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
996 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1001 	    !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) ||  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1002 	    !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) ||  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1003 	    (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1005 	      __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1110  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
1120 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in cap_emulate_setxuid()  argument
1127 	    (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1128 	     !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1129 	     !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) {  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1131 			cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1132 			cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1140 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1142 	if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1143 		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1144 	if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1145 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1150  * @new: The proposed credentials
1159 int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)  in cap_task_fix_setuid()  argument
1168 			cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1180 			if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1181 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1182 					cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1184 			if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1185 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1186 					cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1187 							 new->cap_permitted);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1272 	struct cred *new;  in cap_prctl_drop()  local
1279 	new = prepare_creds();  in cap_prctl_drop()
1280 	if (!new)  in cap_prctl_drop()
1282 	cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1283 	return commit_creds(new);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1305 	struct cred *new;  in cap_task_prctl()  local
1372 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1373 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1375 		new->securebits = arg2;  in cap_task_prctl()
1376 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1390 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1391 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1394 			new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1396 			new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1397 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1404 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1405 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1407 			cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_task_prctl()
1408 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1427 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1428 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1431 				cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1433 				cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1434 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1444  * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
1445  * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
1448  * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current