233  * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
235  * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
236  * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
237  * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
240  * process's capability sets.  The changes are made to the proposed new
243 int cap_capset(struct cred *new,  in cap_capset()  argument
259 		/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */  in cap_capset()
262 	/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */  in cap_capset()
270 	new->cap_effective   = *effective;  in cap_capset()
271 	new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;  in cap_capset()
272 	new->cap_permitted   = *permitted;  in cap_capset()
278 	new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,  in cap_capset()
281 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_capset()
528  * Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0.
584  * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
592 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()  local
605 	new->cap_permitted.val =  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
606 		(new->cap_bset.val & caps->permitted.val) |  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
607 		(new->cap_inheritable.val & caps->inheritable.val);  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
609 	if (caps->permitted.val & ~new->cap_permitted.val)  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
793 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in handle_privileged_root()  local
802 	if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
811 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
813 		new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,  in handle_privileged_root()
819 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))  in handle_privileged_root()
830 static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in __is_setuid()  argument
831 { return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }  in __is_setuid()
833 static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in __is_setgid()  argument
834 { return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }  in __is_setgid()
853 static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,  in nonroot_raised_pE()  argument
858 	if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
859 	     !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
860 	       (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
863 	     __is_suid(root, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
864 	     !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
865 	    (!__is_setuid(new, old) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
867 	       __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
868 	      __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))  in nonroot_raised_pE()
880  * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
890 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()  local
902 	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
907 	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
913 	 * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
915 	is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
917 	if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
919 	     !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
921 		if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
923 			new->euid = new->uid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
924 			new->egid = new->gid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
926 		new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
930 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
931 	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
935 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
941 	new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
948 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
950 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
952 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
955 	if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
956 		ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
961 	new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
963 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
968 	    (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
970 	      __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1075  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
1085 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in cap_emulate_setxuid()  argument
1092 	    (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1093 	     !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1094 	     !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) {  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1096 			cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1097 			cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1105 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1107 	if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1108 		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1109 	if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1110 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1115  * @new: The proposed credentials
1124 int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)  in cap_task_fix_setuid()  argument
1133 			cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1145 			if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1146 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1147 					cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1149 			if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1150 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1151 					cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1152 							 new->cap_permitted);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1237 	struct cred *new;  in cap_prctl_drop()  local
1244 	new = prepare_creds();  in cap_prctl_drop()
1245 	if (!new)  in cap_prctl_drop()
1247 	cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1248 	return commit_creds(new);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1270 	struct cred *new;  in cap_task_prctl()  local
1320 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1321 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1323 		new->securebits = arg2;  in cap_task_prctl()
1324 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1338 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1339 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1342 			new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1344 			new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1345 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1352 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1353 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1355 			cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_task_prctl()
1356 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1375 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1376 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1379 				cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1381 				cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1382 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1392  * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
1393  * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
1396  * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current