1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
6  *	- Rafael R. Reilova (moved everything from head.S),
8  *	- Channing Corn (tests & fixes),
9  *	- Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
20 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
24 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
29 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
53 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
57 /* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
76  * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
87 	 * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless  in update_spec_ctrl_cond()
197 	 * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.  in x86_virt_spec_ctrl()
202 		hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);  in x86_virt_spec_ctrl()
231 /* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
266 		return -EINVAL;  in mds_cmdline()
291 /* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
368 		return -EINVAL;  in tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline()
429 	 * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can  in mmio_select_mitigation()
461 		return -EINVAL;  in mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline()
524 	 * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update  in md_clear_select_mitigation()
621 		return -EINVAL;  in srbds_parse_cmdline()
788 		return -EINVAL;  in gds_parse_cmdline()
830 	 * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these  in smap_works_speculatively()
849 		 * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS  in spectre_v1_select_mitigation()
874 			 * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)  in spectre_v1_select_mitigation()
933 		return -EINVAL;  in retbleed_parse_cmdline()
1117 	return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";  in spectre_v2_module_string()
1184 	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED]	= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection",
1215 	int ret, i;  in spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()  local
1231 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {  in spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()
1232 		if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {  in spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()
1233 			spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,  in spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()
1234 						v2_user_options[i].secure);  in spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()
1235 			return v2_user_options[i].cmd;  in spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()
1306 			"always-on" : "conditional");  in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
1313 	 * Intel's Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target  in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
1314 	 * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which  in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
1315 	 * implicitly enables cross-thread protections.  However, in legacy IBRS  in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
1318 	 * These modes therefore disable the implicit cross-thread protection,  in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
1329 	 * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on  in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
1340 			pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n");  in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
1388 	int ret, i;  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()  local
1398 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1399 		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1401 		cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1405 	if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1417 		       mitigation_options[i].option);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1426 		       mitigation_options[i].option);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1434 		       mitigation_options[i].option);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1440 		       mitigation_options[i].option);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1446 		       mitigation_options[i].option);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1452 		       mitigation_options[i].option);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1458 		       mitigation_options[i].option);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1462 	spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1463 			   mitigation_options[i].secure);  in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
1477 /* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
1509 	 * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1523 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1643 	 * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1644 	 * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1663 	 *    which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry.  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1668 	 *    When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1673 	 *    The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1677 	 *    If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev',  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1678 	 *    'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1681 	 *    The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1684 	 *    The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1690 	 * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1705 	 * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1745 		mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off");  in update_stibp_strict()
1773 	 * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.  in update_mds_branch_idle()
1786 …T "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/…
1787 …T "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/…
1788 …e Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/…
1882 	int ret, i;  in ssb_parse_cmdline()  local
1893 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {  in ssb_parse_cmdline()
1894 			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))  in ssb_parse_cmdline()
1897 			cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;  in ssb_parse_cmdline()
1901 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {  in ssb_parse_cmdline()
1948 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.  in __ssb_select_mitigation()
1949 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass  in __ssb_select_mitigation()
1950 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation  in __ssb_select_mitigation()
1987 	 * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current  in task_update_spec_tif()
1988 	 * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU  in task_update_spec_tif()
1992 	 * always the current task.  in task_update_spec_tif()
1994 	if (tsk == current)  in task_update_spec_tif()
2002 		return -EPERM;  in l1d_flush_prctl_set()
2006 		set_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);  in l1d_flush_prctl_set()
2009 		clear_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);  in l1d_flush_prctl_set()
2012 		return -ERANGE;  in l1d_flush_prctl_set()
2020 		return -ENXIO;  in ssb_prctl_set()
2026 			return -EPERM;  in ssb_prctl_set()
2044 			return -EPERM;  in ssb_prctl_set()
2050 		return -ERANGE;  in ssb_prctl_set()
2079 		 * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl  in ib_prctl_set()
2088 			return -EPERM;  in ib_prctl_set()
2101 			return -EPERM;  in ib_prctl_set()
2110 		if (task == current)  in ib_prctl_set()
2114 		return -ERANGE;  in ib_prctl_set()
2130 		return -ENODEV;  in arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set()
2150 	if (test_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH))  in l1d_flush_prctl_get()
2210 		return -ENODEV;  in arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get()
2229 /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
2253 	if (c->x86 != 6)  in override_cache_bits()
2256 	switch (c->x86_model) {  in override_cache_bits()
2270 		if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)  in override_cache_bits()
2271 			c->x86_cache_bits = 44;  in override_cache_bits()
2311 			e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {  in l1tf_select_mitigation()
2316 …pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help y…  in l1tf_select_mitigation()
2329 		return -EINVAL;  in l1tf_cmdline()
2385 		return -EINVAL;  in srso_parse_cmdline()
2391 	else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret"))  in srso_parse_cmdline()
2395 	else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))  in srso_parse_cmdline()
2404 #define SRSO_NOTICE "WARNING: See https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html …
2436 		pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");  in srso_select_mitigation()
2627 		return ", STIBP: always-on";  in stibp_state()
2640 			return ", IBPB: always-on";  in ibpb_state()
2653 			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence";  in pbrsb_eibrs_state()
2655 			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable";  in pbrsb_eibrs_state()
2657 		return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected";  in pbrsb_eibrs_state()
2694 			return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n");  in retbleed_show_state()