800 	struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;  in sev_es_sync_vmsa()
806 	/* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */  in sev_es_sync_vmsa()
811 	 * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not  in sev_es_sync_vmsa()
812 	 * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the  in sev_es_sync_vmsa()
813 	 * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep  in sev_es_sync_vmsa()
885 	pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");  in sev_es_sync_vmsa()
894 	struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()  local
903 	/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
910 	 * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
913 	clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
915 	vmsa.reserved = 0;  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
916 	vmsa.handle = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->handle;  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
917 	vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
918 	vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
919 	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);  in __sev_launch_update_vmsa()
2014 		 * Transfer VMSA and GHCB state to the destination.  Nullify and  in sev_migrate_from()
2427 		u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;  in snp_launch_update_vmsa()
2433 		/* Transition the VMSA page to a firmware state. */  in snp_launch_update_vmsa()
2438 		/* Issue the SNP command to encrypt the VMSA */  in snp_launch_update_vmsa()
2439 		data.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);  in snp_launch_update_vmsa()
3155 	 * If it's an SNP guest, then the VMSA was marked in the RMP table as  in sev_free_vcpu()
3160 		u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;  in sev_free_vcpu()
3167 		sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa);  in sev_free_vcpu()
3169 	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));  in sev_free_vcpu()
3468 	 * VMSA, e.g. if userspace forces the vCPU to be RUNNABLE after an SNP  in pre_sev_run()
3876 	/* Clear use of the VMSA */  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3880 	 * When replacing the VMSA during SEV-SNP AP creation,  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3896 	 * The new VMSA will be private memory guest memory, so retrieve the  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3903 	 * From this point forward, the VMSA will always be a guest-mapped page  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3904 	 * rather than the initial one allocated by KVM in svm->sev_es.vmsa. In  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3905 	 * theory, svm->sev_es.vmsa could be free'd and cleaned up here, but  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3913 	/* Use the new VMSA */  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3921 	 * then care should be taken to ensure svm->sev_es.vmsa is pinned  in sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state()
3961 			vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP VMSA address [%#llx] from guest\n",  in sev_snp_ap_creation()
3967 		 * Malicious guest can RMPADJUST a large page into VMSA which  in sev_snp_ap_creation()
3970 		 * of VMSA page, reject the AP CREATE request if VMSA address from  in sev_snp_ap_creation()
3975 				    "vmgexit: AP VMSA address [%llx] from guest is unsafe as it is 2M aligned\n",  in sev_snp_ap_creation()
4464 	 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the  in sev_es_init_vmcb()
4465 	 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical  in sev_es_init_vmcb()
4467 	 * the VMSA will be NULL if this vCPU is the destination for intrahost  in sev_es_init_vmcb()
4470 	if (svm->sev_es.vmsa && !svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa)  in sev_es_init_vmcb()
4471 		svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);  in sev_es_init_vmcb()
4577 	 * the guest has actually enabled (or not!) in the VMSA.  in sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest()
4645 	 * 2MB-aligned VMCB, VMSA, or AVIC backing page.  in snp_safe_alloc_page_node()