Lines Matching full:amd

14 Return Address Predictor (RAP) on AMD).
35 (Intel and AMD) and RSB underflow (Intel only).  They must each be
41 RSB poisoning (Intel and AMD)
54   [#intel-rsb-filling]_ [#amd-rsb-filling]_ when transitioning between
68   * AMD:
69 	On Zen 4+, IBPB (or SBPB [#amd-sbpb]_ if used) clears the RSB.
70 	This is indicated by IBPB_RET in CPUID [#amd-ibpb-rsb]_.
72 	On Zen < 4, the RSB filling sequence [#amd-rsb-filling]_ must be
73 	always be done in addition to IBPB [#amd-ibpb-no-rsb]_.  This is
92   * AMD:
95 	AMD recommends software use a RAP stuffing sequence (mitigation
99 	Protection"." [#amd-smep-rsb]_
112   * AMD:
115 	[#amd-eibrs-vmexit]_
135 AMD RETBleed / SRSO / Branch Type Confusion
138 On AMD, poisoned RSB entries can also be created by the AMD RETBleed
139 variant [#retbleed-paper]_ [#amd-btc]_ or by Speculative Return Stack
140 Overflow [#amd-srso]_ (Inception [#inception-paper]_).  The kernel
228 .. [#amd-rsb-filling] "Mitigation V2-3" in `Software Techniques for Managing Speculation <https://w…
232 .. [#amd-sbpb] IBPB without flushing of branch type predictions.  Only exists for AMD.
234 …amd-ibpb-rsb] "Function 8000_0008h -- Processor Capacity Parameters and Extended Feature Identific…
236 .. [#amd-ibpb-no-rsb] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://comsec.ethz.ch/wp…
240 .. [#amd-smep-rsb] "Existing Mitigations" in `Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusi…
244 …amd-eibrs-vmexit] "Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER)" in `AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Ma…
252 .. [#amd-btc] `Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion <https://www.amd.com/content…
254 .. [#amd-srso] `Technical Update Regarding Speculative Return Stack Overflow <https://www.amd.com/c…